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Abstract 
This paper incorporates the phenomenon of tolerance into an economic analysis, 
showing how different attitudes to trust and cooperation can affect economic outcomes. In 
the economic system we propose, tolerance is associated with the different weight that 
agents attribute to their own nature and to the institutional parameters in their utility function. 
We thus construct an overlapping generations model (OLG), showing that the incentives that 
influence descendants’  predisposition to tolerance depend on both institutional factors, 
where behaviour is imposed by rules, and on social (or cultural) factors, found in popular 
customs and established traditions. Our study highlights the absolute impossibility of 
affirming tolerance through formal rules. In fact, we show that intolerance emerges as 
persistent attitude (intolerance trap) and its control is only possible through constant and 
continuous interventions on the educational processes of new generations. 
 
Keywords: tolerance, overlapping generation model 
 
JEL Classification: D1, Z1 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper shows that the phenomenon of tolerance, defined as a generic ability 
to accept diversity, can easily be integrated into an economic model, providing a 
new explanation for a number of both economic and social phenomena. The 
economic literature on this subject is fairly recent; intolerant behavior inevitably 
affects several important factors of economic growth and social development, such 
as trust between economic agents, cooperation, the free movement of ideas and 
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talent and at the same time promoting corruption and rewarding group membership 
rather than merit (Tabellini, 2010). 
The theory developed in this article is the natural continuation of Iannaccone’s 
(1997) economic study on fundamentalism that recently culminated in Arce-
Sandler’s (2003-2008) and Epstein-Gang’s (2007) theoretical models and in Corneo-
Jeanne’s (2009) preliminary and pioneering study on the economic theory of 
tolerance.  
In this paper, we adopt a model to analyze the evolution and persistence of 
social attitudes towards tolerance through the dynamic properties of a precise 
mechanism of cultural transmission and socialization.  
More specifically, tolerance is incorporated in an OLG model, showing that this 
has a remarkable impact on the economic equilibria of the system. In our model, the 
cultural values of tolerance are transmitted through the educational efforts exerted 
by parents on their children. However, the incentives that influence the descendants’ 
predisposition to tolerance depend on both institutional factors, where behaviors are 
imposed by rules, and on social (or cultural) factors, found in popular customs and 
established traditions. The tolerant individual reaches a compromise between the 
different influences by minimizing the friction between her own and social choices. In 
this choice, economic-type evaluations will prevail. 
Our model assumes that there are two social categories, 'tolerant' and 'intolerant', 
identified on the basis of their different behavioral characteristics, or rather, by a 
different representation of own preferences. Each member of the population has 
either the 'tolerant' or 'intolerant' characteristics deriving from the educational efforts 
of parents in the transmission of these characteristics. According to Bisin-Verdier’s 
(1998, 2001) approach, parents choose the cultural transmission coefficient 
(educational effort), or rather, the probability with which their cultural traits (their true 
disposition to tolerance) are adopted by the child. If the child (i.e. the new 
generation) does not learn from the parent, then she will assume the character of an 
individual at random. Our analysis demonstrates that the model is able to replicate 
some important social and historical phenomena, such as the persistence of 
widespread intolerance in countries that have adopted strong legislation to protect 
freedom and respect for diversity (Inglehart, 1997 - Inglehart-Baker, 2000). As it is 
confirmed by empirical evidence (Corneo – Jeanne, 2009), in our model intolerance 
is much more common and persistent than tolerance. 
Under specific conditions and institutional arrangements, society can converge on 
one of two possible stable equilibria: a "good equilibrium" where there is a balance 
between the share of tolerant and intolerant individuals and a "bad equilibrium" 
characterized by widespread intolerance where tolerant individuals, representing a 
minority, are encouraged to hide their true character.  
What is interesting is that equilibrium with widespread tolerance ('good equilibrium') 
is particularly fragile in the sense that, following a minimal change in the agent 
expectations, the system tends to move away from this, automatically converging 
towards the 'bad equilibrium'. In contrast, equilibrium with widespread intolerance is 
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particularly robust, insensitive to any changes in agent expectations. The system, 
therefore, tends to naturally exist in a situation called the "intolerance trap" where 
the only means to exit is through constant public interventions. Significant policy 
implications derive from these propositions. The maintenance of a social system 
inspired by the values of tolerance requires a steady and sustained commitment 
from the authorities, since the system is unable to ensure its own stability. This result 
provides a convincing explanation of the frequent outbursts of intolerance that occur 
in societies, which for some time now have been considered free from ideological 
constraints and a respectful of diversity, but also explains the profound differences in 
the levels of tolerance between different industrialized countries (see for example 
Florida 2004). 
From an economic perspective, this study allows assessing the effectiveness of 
specific policy interventions in order to facilitate the dissemination and integration of 
values in society. The model demonstrates the ineffectiveness of policies aimed at 
spreading tolerance based exclusively on legislative and institutional reforms, 
suggesting instead the adoption of systems that leverage on 'profound' factors, 
through the appropriate education of young generations. Such interventions, 
however, must never stop: any disruption would in fact plunge society back into a 
state dominated by intolerance. The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines 
the model or agents’ preferences and associated educational choices; in section 3 
we determine the equilibrium steady state of the system by identifying its main 
characteristics and showing under which conditions the system enters into the 
intolerance trap; in section 4 we analyze the economic policy implications arising 
from the propositions set forth in the previous sections; section 5 contains our 
conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
In this section, we propose an OLG model in which each individual lives for two periods, 
first as a child (new agent) and then as an adult (older agent). In the first period of life, the 
child has not yet assumed well-defined cultural traits and preferences, which are instead 
acquired through observation, imitation and the adoption of the cultural models that they will 
come into contact with. 
Each child, in fact, is first subjected to the influences of the family (represented by an 
adult) and then to those of society. In the former case, this is about vertical transmission, in 
the latter the oblique transmission of cultural traits1. In this context, the socialization process 
can be interpreted as the result of an economic choice: each parent (adult) will invest 
resources in an effort to educate the child according to her aptitudes. The parent’s 
educational effort is subject to a form of myopia known as "imperfect empathy" and plays a 
key role in the analysis: the parent is altruistic but perceives the child's welfare through a 
filter of her own preferences.  
                                               
1
 The transmission mechanism of cultural traits hypothesized in the paper is in accordance  with 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman’s (1981) key studies on cultural anthropology . 
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The tolerant parent exercises an educational effort iτ , which also indicates the 
probability with which this effort will succeed, in which case the child will assume the same 
preferences as the parent. Otherwise, she will remain naive (without well-defined 
preferences), and will begin to be subjected to the influences of society. That is she will 
become a tolerant adult with probability iz (which indicates the portion of tolerant individuals 
in society) and she will become intolerant with a specular probability of iz−1 .   
The incentive for adults to influence their descendants’ predisposition towards tolerance 
also depends on institutional factors, specifically on the expectations of how much the value 
of tolerance will be protected by regulations and social relations. To this end, the model 
hypothesizes a simple mechanism for the formation of institutions whereby norms and 
attitudes are affirmed, incorporating that which has been affirmed on a social level. 
The social life of an individual can thus be ascribed to three environmental influences2: 
• an institutional environment, in which behaviors and attitudes are governed by 
laws (formal rules); 
• a social environment, which summarizes customs and traditions (informal 
norms), not necessarily in line with that established by law; 
• an individual environment, represented by the individual’s set of values and 
attitudes, the result of upbringing and social conditioning.  
 
        The three environments are closely interlinked: the generalized attitudes of individuals 
consolidate traditions and customs that, in turn, contribute to the formation of laws (North 
1990). On the other hand, as will become clearer later on, the regulatory apparatus of a 
State can induce significant changes in the evolutionary dynamics of individual aptitudes, 
thus inverting the causality link. The tolerant individual makes a clear compromise between 
the different influential environments, endeavoring to create the least amount of friction 
between her choices and those imposed by norms and personal aptitudes. To the contrary, 
the intolerant individual, in making her own choices, takes into account only the values and 
standards pertaining to her individual sphere, not accepting any compromise with that 
established by the rules (formal and informal) that are inconsistent with her own principles. 
The ideological fundamentalism that characterizes the intolerant person leads her to assign 
the maximum loss of welfare to any deviation, even minimal, from her own principles and to 
attribute the highest satisfaction in all cases where these principles are fully respected, even 
if the institutional context openly condemns them3.  
As observed by Sen (2006), the fundamentalist has a strong sense of belonging to specific 
values and principles, which sooner or later will lead to conflict with people and institutions 
that do not share them, openly manifesting her intolerance.  
 
2.1 The preferences 
Economic agents are distinguished by their predisposition to tolerance. This model studies 
the simplest case where there are only two types of individuals: those with attitude a , the 
                                               
2 Many sociological studies use similar conceptualizations to those we have introduced. See in this 
regard the work of Persell-Green-Gurevich (2001). 
3 Rather often, individuals openly demonstrate intolerance despite facing sanctions, in demonstration 
of how ideology prevails over evaluations of convenience. 
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tolerant, and those with attitude b , the intolerant. Let us suppose that tolerance is 
measured by an index i  so that [ ]i supa =  and [ ]i infb =  where 1=a  and 0=b .4 
As will be made clearer later on, an individual type that has a measure of tolerance bai ,=  
can actually manifest behavior that is "remote" from her own nature, i.e., declaring through 
her choices a tolerance level ajb <<  as a result of the conditions created by formal and 
informal rules. An individual of type bai ,=  can manifest her predisposition to tolerance in 
such a way as to maximize the following quadratic (utility) function:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] )1(                       232221 iiinfiifii miamamaU −+−+−−= θθ
               
 
 
where amb i ≤≤  indicates the declared predisposition to tolerance, ab
f ≤≤ θ  the 
tolerance level of formal institutions, ab nf ≤≤ θ  the tolerance level of informal institutions 
and  i the individual’s actual predisposition to tolerance. The vector ( )iii aaa 321 ,,  is 
indicative of the saliency that the individual assigns to the various environmental influences 
(institutional, social and individual), with   1
3
1∑ = =j jia  and 0≥jia .  
 
In distinguishing only two types of individuals, the objective function becomes: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] )2(                      1 232221 aaanfaafaa mamamaU −+−+−−= θθ  
 
for the tolerant individual and 
 
  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] )3(                     0 232221 bbbnfbbfbb mamamaU −+−+−−= θθ  
 
for the intolerant individual5. 
 
The difference between a tolerant and an intolerant individual resides in the different weight 
they attribute to their own nature )( 3ia and to the institutional parameters ),( 21 ii aa . 
 The intolerant individual is by nature averse to the principles of sharing and socializing with 
people who do not have the same preferences. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
she tends to indulge and manifest high levels of intolerance, even though condemned at the 
institutional and social level. In her decisional process, therefore, the intolerant individual 
                                               
4
 A possible objection  could be that the model correspond to a boundary (knife-edge) case in the set 
of possible specifications. However it is easily to show that even considering  a non-degenerate  case 
with a<1 and b>0  with 0<b<a<1 for respectively tolerant and  intolerant individuals, our main results 
do not change. 
5 In this first version of the model we suppose society as divided in totally tolerant and totally 
intolerant  individuals. The dichotomy allow us an easily application of the cultural transmission 
mechanism introduced by Bisin-Verdier (2000)  widely applied in important studies on cultural 
transmission of preferences (see Hauk-Marti, 2002). Further and more advanced reelaboration of the 
model could adopt a representation of the evolution of tolerance in the cultural formation of 
continuous preferences framework, which has recently been introduced by Pichler (2010). 
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attaches little weight to institutional parameters: without compromising the results of the 
model, it is assumed that 13 =ba , for which the objective function is reduced to 
( )2bb mU −= . 
To the contrary, the tolerant individual tries to create minimal friction between her attitude 
and that determined by formal and informal rules. The distribution of weight will thus be less 
unbalanced than that of the intolerant individual, i.e. ( ) 0,, 321 >>aaa aaa .   
By maximizing the objective function, we obtain the tolerance attitude of the two types of 
agents: 
0*
321
*
=
++=
b
a
nf
a
f
aa
m
aaam θθ
                                   (4) 
 
where 10 * ≤< am   and 1* == ama  when 1== nff θθ . 
Now we expand the model by adding the temporal dimension and considering an 
overlapping generation mechanism by which parents and society transmit cultural traits to 
future generations.  
Each agent lives two periods. In the first period, she is a child and has no specific 
preferences; in the second, she becomes an adult with a definitive attitude towards 
tolerance and chooses to manifest the attitude by maximizing her utility function.   
Preferences are transmitted to the child by the parent’s educational efforts (vertical 
transmission) and by the cultural influences of society (oblique transmission)6: if the child 
does not learn from the parent, she adopts the preferences of a randomly chosen adult. 
Parents want to maximize their child’s future well-being, but they evaluate the welfare of 
their children through their own preference structure according to the hypothesis of imperfect 
empathy (see Bisin-Verdier, (2001))7.  
Empathy is the psychological process that consists in directly absorbing the emotional 
conditions of another person; the imperfection we attribute to this process consists in a kind 
of myopic behavior of the parent who evaluates the future choices of her child without 
considering the child’s effective preferences and exclusively referring to their own.  
To formalize these concepts let us suppose at time t each adult of type i  ( )bai ,=  has a 
child and chooses the effort 
i
tτ  to educate her. This effort equates to the probability with 
which the child will adopt the parent’s preferences ( )10 ≤≤ itτ . Now, letting jitP ,  be the 
transition probability that a child of parent i  is of type j  and considering a tolerant adult, we 
can write  
 ( ) (5)                                              1, tatataat zP ττ −+=  ( )( ) )6(                                              11, tatbat zP −−= τ  
                                               
6 On the concepts of vertical and oblique transmission of cultural traits, see Cavalli-Sforza, (1996) and 
Cavalli-Sforza, Fieldman, (1981). 
7 Given that at the time of its education the child still has no precise preferences, the parent evaluates 
the child’s future utilities through her own perspective. In other words, she will use her own utility 
function as if it were the child’s. 
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where tz  is the proportion of tolerant adults at time t. Similarly, for the intolerant adult we 
have  ( )( ) (7)                                       11, tbtbtbbt zP −−+= ττ  ( ) (8)                                                      1, tbtabt zP τ−=  
 
 
2.2 The education choice 
 
We can now characterize the education choice following Bisin-Verdier (1998, 2001). 
A type i parent will choose the educational effort [ ]1,0∈iτ , which maximizes 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) (9)                                        ,,,, iejitjiteiitiiti CUPUP τθθβ −+=Γ  
 
where β  is the discount rate, ( )itC τ  the cost of educational effort made by the type i 
parent which is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly convex with 
( ) 00 =C , ( ) 00 =′C  and that for all τ  0>′>′′ CC , and ( )ejitU θ,  the expected utility 
from the economic action of a type j  child as perceived by a type i  parent when she 
expects ( ) ( )],[ nffe EE θθθ = . ( )ejitU θ,  is therefore dependent on the expectations on the 
future level of tolerance in formal and informal institutions. 
Given the assumption of imperfect empathy, when estimating ( )ejitU θ,  the type i parent will 
apply her own utility function.  
However we suppose a fundamental difference in the educational aptitude of intolerant 
adults. The intolerant adult will only accept the full sharing of her own values, assigning any 
deviation from them to a maximum loss of wellbeing. Despite the tolerance manifested by a 
tolerant child being  amb a ≤<
* , the intolerant parent will value this choice as if   
1* == ama , thus assigning a maximum loss of wellbeing to tolerance: in fact, it can be 
demonstrated that  bU argmaxb =   and  bU argmina = . From these considerations we 
can see that, independently of expectations, for the intolerant parent it will always be 
0=bbU   and  1−=baU . 
We consider this behavior to be close to the “fundamentalist” attitude typical of intolerant 
individuals. 
Furthermore, given that  0** => ba mm   we get  ( ) ( )ejieii UU θθ ,, >   for each eθ . That 
is, each parent prefers a child that adopts her own preferences.  
By solving the maximization problem8 and suppressing the time indicators, we obtain the 
following conditions9: 
 ( )( ) ( ) (10)                                           1,, abaaa CzUU τβ ′=−−  
                                               
8 Note that ( )τC  must be sufficiently convex so that the optimal solution is 10 << τ . 
9 Expressions (9) - (15) are a recapitulation of results already shown in Bisin-Verdier (2001). 
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 ( ) ( ) (11)                                                ,, babbb CzUU τβ ′=−   
 
 
From these equations, it follows that the optimal effort level is ( )ijiiii UUz −= ,ττ , 
baji ,, =  ji ≠ . 
 
Using the implicit function theorem, we get  
 ( )( ) (12)                                       0
,,
<
′′
−
−=
∂
∂
a
baaaa
C
UU
z τ
βτ
  
 
 
( )( ) (13)                                      0
,,
>
′′
−
=
∂
∂
b
abbbb
C
UU
z τ
βτ
 
 
Given that jiii UU ,, −  depends on the expectations, the same will apply to the educational 
effort ( )ijiiii UUz −= ,ττ . 
 
The educational effort of type a  (tolerant agent) decreases as the proportion of tolerant 
agents increases. In fact, higher values of z indicate a higher probability that the child 
assumes the same preferences as the parent simply by socializing with a member of 
society; this induces the parent to reduce the educational effort. Similarly, if the proportion of 
tolerant agents increases, intolerant parents must intensify their educational efforts. 
 
We can now characterize the dynamic behavior of tz  with the following difference equation:  
( ) (14)                                          1 ,,1 abttaattt PzPzz −+=+  
  
where substituting for aatP
,  and abtP
,  the dynamic equations becomes  
 
( )( ) (15)                                            11 btattttt zzzz ττ −−+=+  
 
The analysis of the dynamic equation will focus on the stable expectation hypothesis, with 
abaa UU −   and   babb UU −  constant for each t. 
 
In this hypothesis this difference equation has two unstable fixed points 0=z  and 1=z , 
and  a unique stable fixed point  *zz =   
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (16)                              ,,,,
,,
*
eabebbebaeaa
ebaeaa
e
UUUU
UU
z
θθθθ
θθθ
−+−
−
=  
 
with ba ττ = . 
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(Proof: see appendix) 
 
 
2.3 The choice of institutions 
In this model we distinguish between formal and informal institutions, according to North’s 
definition (North, 1990), and formalize the concept by using the vector ( )nff θθθ ,= . 
According to this definition, formal institutions are the political, social and economic 
regulations in force; they usually emerge to increase the effectiveness of habits, customs 
and religious traits (informal institutions) diffused in the population. We can thus suppose 
that informal institutions represent the level of tolerance of the prevailing type in each period. 
If the fraction tz  is larger than 2
1 , then tolerant agents are in the majority and their attitudes 
constitute informal institutions, and 1== anfθ . On the other hand when tz  is less than 2
1 , 
the level of 
nfθ  will be strongly affected by fundamentalist customs and 0== bnfθ . 
 
To summarize 
(17)                                       )(
2
1
2
1






≤
>
=
t
t
t
nf
zifb
zifa
zθ   
 
The mechanism we have introduced allows us to formalize the idea that tolerant habits and 
beliefs spread when there is insufficient social aversion to oppose them.  
On the other hand, institutions reduce the cost of individual convictions, and hence 
ideologies, religion and moral codes can produce very significant institutional alterations 
(North, 1990). This consideration allows us to assume that when formal institutions evolve 
freely (that is, without exogenous impositions) they will tend to coincide with informal rules 
as time goes by, that is, for a fixed level of 
nfθ , nff θθ →  during a finite time t. 
 
3. The steady state 
We can now characterize the steady states according to the expected level of formal and 
informal institutions.  
 
Lemma 1 
Given an expected institutional vector eθ  then ba ττ
<
>  when ( )et zz θ*>< . 
 
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
 
Lemma 2 
Each institutional combination ( )jie ,=θ ,  with aib ≤≤  and ajb ≤≤ , generates a 
unique and different stable steady state ),(*
,
jizz ji =  with fi θ=  and nfj θ= . 
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However, given the assumptions on institutions, we only consider institutional situations with 
baf ,=θ  and banf ,=θ ; thus the following relations hold: 
 
1) 21
,
=aaz . 
2) 21
,
<bbz ; babb zz <, ; abbb zz <, . 
3) 21
,
<baz  ,  21, <abz  , abba zz ,, >
< . 
 
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
The stable steady state abz ,  can be excluded from the analysis inasmuch as, given the 
hypothesis on the formation mechanism of institutions, tolerance  is not possible on the level 
of informal institutions when the proportion of tolerant individuals is in the minority. 
For the moment, we also exclude from the analysis the study of convergence towards the 
equilibrium point baz , , since this can be reached only with intervention on a regulatory level 
that imposes tolerance through formal rules. This aspect will be discussed in detail in section 
4.1, which further analyses the role of policy in the dissemination of tolerance. 
 
Proposition 1 (intolerance trap): As Bisin-Verdier (1998), we assume that the cost function 
has the quadratic form ( ) ( )
2
2i
iC ττ = 10, { }1,00 ≠z  and that agents have rational 
expectations. We further indicate with ijtz 1+  the proportion of tolerant individuals at time 
1+t  if at time  t  the expectations are  ( )jie ,=θ   where  bai ,=   and baj ,= .  
Thus: 
1. tz  converges to bbz  if 21<tz ; 
2. if  21>tz  then 
2.1 tz  converges to aaz ; 
2.2 tz  converges to bbz  only if tz  is sufficiently close to 1/2 such that  
2/11 <+
bb
tz . 
 
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
The multiplicity of stable steady states depends on the possibility of having different 
institutions that are able to influence adult expectations on the future utility of their children 
and therefore the amount of educational effort exercised by them. 
Only in one case does the educational effort of the tolerant agent exceed that of the 
intolerant agent i.e. when bbt zz < . In this case, however, the only rational expectation is  ( )bb,  which determines the convergence to 21<bbz . 
                                               
10 It can be easily verified that this function of cost respects all the properties hypothesized at the 
beginning and ensures  10 ≤≤ iτ  being 10 ≤−≤ ijii UU .  
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In general, the equilibrium point aaz  or at least a proportion of tolerant individuals 21>tz  
can never be attained under the assumption of rational expectations if 210 <z .  
The “resistance” of the equilibrium point with intolerance is strongly linked to the fact that the 
intolerant individual assigns a maximum utility loss to preferences that are different from her 
own, i.e.  1−=baU ; for this individual the difference babb UU −  that determines her 
educational effort bτ   is always maximum. Only a sufficiently low value of tz , i.e. 
( )bbt zz <  can guarantee that ba ττ > . In all other cases, the educational effort of the 
intolerant individual tends to prevail, trapping the system in a state where the proportion of 
tolerant individuals can at most be equal to the proportion of intolerant individuals 
( )2/1=≤ aat zz 11. This consideration is far from absurd when you consider that in reality 
the fundamentalist attitude of intolerant individuals leads them to strongly defend their 
positions (that is, to exert considerable educational efforts to conserve their ideas), even in 
social contexts where tolerance seems to be a custom, and this would explain why 
intolerance is so persistent.  
Nevertheless, even in a best-case scenario, with the equilibrium proportion of tolerant 
individuals equal to 2/1=aaz , a resumption of convergence towards the "bad" steady state 
is still possible. In this situation, any expectation ( ) ( )aaji ,, ≠  would provoke an immediate 
reduction of the proportion of tolerant individuals with 2/11 <+
ij
tz . The expectation will be 
confirmed given that  ( ) ( )aaji ,, ≠∀  2/1<ijz  and the system will start to converge again 
towards  bbz . 
This phenomenon is also possible due to the proportion of tolerant individuals being above 
1/2, provided that the pessimistic expectations ( )bb,  or ( )ba,   are able to bring that 
proportion, as early as in the next period, to below 1/2. 
A high tolerance steady state is fragile. A change in expectations is enough to take the 
system back to bad equilibrium. Once the proportion of tolerant individuals has become the 
minority, the system is no longer able to re-converge towards the "good” equilibrium, not 
even in the presence of positive expectations since these will never be confirmed. 
 
4. Policy implications 
As demonstrated in Proposition 1, under the hypothesis of rational expectations the steady 
state to which the system converges depends on the initial proportion of tolerant agents.  
Moreover, under appropriate hypotheses, society is unable by itself to exit from the 
“intolerance trap”; if 21<tz , the proportion of tolerant agents remain a minority even in the 
future.   
                                               
11 If we were to also permit the intolerant individual to assign positive weights to the institutional 
dimension (i.e., 13 <ba )  we would have 2/11
1
2
3
>
+
=
b
aa
a
z  i.e., an increase in the share of 
tolerant individuals in equilibrium. That affirmed in proposition 1 would still be valid. However, in this 
case the system could converge to aaz  if 2/11 >+
aa
tz  even with 2/1<tz .  
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The model suggests two possible policy measures aimed at increasing the proportion of 
tolerant agents in the population:  
 
1. introduction of formal rules that penalize intolerant behavior;  
2. educational development of the younger generations.  
 
With the first measure, the steady state becomes bbab zz >  giving rise to an increase in the 
proportion of tolerant agents in equilibrium. 
In fact, we hypothesize a majority share of intolerant individuals characterize the system, 
2/1<tz , and that the government announces an institutional reform imposing tolerance 
for the subsequent periods. This measure will apply only to formal institutions so that agents’ 
expectations will be ( )bae ,=θ  from then onwards, and tz  will converge to bbab zz > . 
Given that 2/1<abz , intolerant individuals will nevertheless remain in the majority; the 
action was unable to change the preferences of society enough so that, although sanctioned 
by law, intolerance will continue to be practiced by the majority of individuals.  The system 
will converge again to bbz  as soon as the legislation in favor of tolerance is withdrawn. This 
type of intervention is not very effective in the long term. Tolerance, in fact, is the result of a 
cultural process whose evolution involves several generations. It is therefore unreasonable 
to think of influencing the nature and preferences of individuals through legal provisions that 
contrast the customs that are prevalent in society.  
 
The second measure consists in the institutions’ direct efforts in educating new generations 
in tolerance.  
We have thus far considered the possibility of modifying a society’s predisposition to 
tolerance through regulatory action imposing tolerant behavior. However, these interventions 
do not significantly condition the educational process that regulates the transmission of 
preferences. 
In this regard, it is appropriate to evaluate the effect of government policies aimed at 
spreading tolerance through the educational system. This type of policy, unlike the 
preceding, has a direct impact on the processes of preference transmission, inasmuch as 
the government’s efforts are integrated with the educational efforts of parents.  
Following Hauk-Marti (2002) we hypothesize that when the parent’s educational effort is 
unsuccessful, there is a probability ρ that the individual becomes tolerant thanks to the 
education received in schools. If even this is unsuccessful in defining the preferences of the 
individual, then she will assume the preferences of a subject chosen randomly from the 
population.   
The transition probabilities thus become: 
 ( ) ( )( ) (18)                                11, ρρττ +−−+= tatataat zP  
 ( )( )( ) (19)                                          111, ρτ −−−= tatbat zP  
 ( )( )( ) (20)                                  111, tbtbtbbt zP −−−+= ρττ  
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( ) ( )( ) (21)                                         11, ρρτ +−−= tbtabt zP  
 
 
generating the following dynamic equation: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } (22)                     1111 ρτττρ btbtattttt zzzz −+−−−=−+  
 
 
The stable steady states are  1=z  and 0=z  if 0=ρ . 
If an internal equilibrium exists, then ab ττ > . 
With 1=ρ  the system converges to 1. Thus, due to continuity, there must be 10 << ρ  
such that 01 >−+ tt zz    for any   1<z . 
More precisely, 01 >−+ tt zz  if
( )
( ) Ω≡−−+
−
> bab
t
ab
t
z
z
τττ
ττρ
1
. 
 
Immediately verifying that  0>∂Ω∂ tz   and that for 1=tz ,  ( )1bτ=Ω . So it is sufficient 
that the government exercises an educational effort  ( )1bτρ >  so have a growing 
proportion of tolerant individuals12. 
The educational effort towards tolerance exercised by the government must never cease, 
even when 2/1>tz . Discontinuity ( 0=ρ ) would make the system converge (at best) to 
aaz  where we have already witnessed that a worsening of expectations would plunge the 
system back towards intolerance. 
The lesson is that tolerance can spread in society only if governments agree on permanent 
dissemination through direct interventions in the educational processes of new generations. 
Schools at every level, information, politics and religious institutions must be vigilant and 
continually educate on tolerance. The social system cannot autonomously guarantee, i.e. 
relying only on the role of families, the stable establishment of tolerance as a consolidated 
and permanent principle over time. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Building on recent efforts on the evolutionary dynamics of fundamentalism and 
cultural transmission, the present paper concentrates on issues relating to the 
formation and stability of attitudes towards tolerance and intolerance. The dynamic 
equation of the model demonstrates that a degenerate distribution of the population 
(whereby agents are all tolerant or all intolerant) is dynamically unstable. Moreover, 
under some conditions and for a specific institutional asset a unique non-degenerate 
stationary distribution exists (in which both tolerance and intolerance co-exist in the 
population), and this distribution is locally stable. Finally, we studied the dependence 
of the population dynamics on institutional changes and policy interventions showing 
                                               
12 Given the quadratic form hypothesized for the cost function, the convergence to 1 of the share of 
tolerant individuals is ensured by
 
βρ > . 
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that tolerance cannot be disseminated through formal rules but requires that 
authorities act directly on the educational processes of new generations. In this 
sense, it is recommended that the government carries out an educational effort  
through schools in an attempt to predispose young people towards tolerance. 
Furthermore, intolerance is a persistent attitude; it can not be totally ruled out from 
society and tends to reemerge also in social contexts that are characterized by a 
widespread respect for diversity as soon as the public educational commitment 
(mainly through schools) stops being sufficiently effective. 
However, the assumption that the different predispositions to tolerance do not have 
effect on the economic opportunities of agents is somewhat limited. Further 
developments of the model should remove this assumption, in order to apply the 
analysis to contexts where agents belonging to different social groups interact not 
only in relation to cultural conditioning but also in real and actual business 
transactions. 
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Appendix 
The proofs we develop in this section follow the same methodology used by Hauk-Marti 
(2002). 
Considering the dynamic equation of population ( )( )btattttt zzzz ττ −−+=+ 11 ; we note 
that it has three rest points: i) 0=z , ii) 1=z  and iii) *zz = with ba ττ = .  
Deriving the dynamic equation with respect to tz  we obtain 
( )( ) ( ) 






∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−+−−+=
∂
∂ +
t
b
t
a
tt
ba
t
t
t
zz
zzz
z
z ττ
ττ 12111 . 
Then  
11
0
1 >+=
∂
∂
=
+ a
zt
t
t
z
z
τ   given that ( ) ( )00 =⇒= btz τ   
( )( ) 111
1
1 >−−+=
∂
∂
=
+ b
zt
t
t
z
z
τ   given that ( ) ( )01 =⇒= atz τ  
then points 0=z  and 1=z  are not stable. 
To evaluate the stability of point ( )ez θ* , rewrite the derivative of the dynamic equation as 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




′′
∆
−
′′
∆−
−+−−+=
∂
∂
+
b
b
a
a
tt
ba
t
t
t
CC
zzz
z
z
τ
β
τ
β
ττ 12111  
given 
( )
( )z
C aa
−
′
=∆
1β
τ
 e  
( )
z
C bb
β
τ′
=∆  ;  
thus 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )





′′
′
−−
′′
′
−
+−−+=
∂
∂ +
b
b
ta
a
t
ba
t
t
t
C
C
z
C
C
zz
z
z
τ
τ
τ
τ
ττ 12111 . 
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Evaluating this derivative in ∗= zz t , i.e. considering 
ba ττ =  and given CC ′′<′ τ∀  we 
have 
( )
( ) ( )1,01
1 ∈





′′
′
−=
∂
∂
∗
=
+
τ
τ
C
C
z
z
zzt
t
t
 
 and conclude that ∗= zz t  is asymptotically  stable. ■ 
 
Lemma 1: Given that ( ) ( )eabeaa UU θθ >  and ( ) ( )ebaebb UU θθ > , by the first order 
condition of the parent maximization problem, each type of agent chooses a positive 
educational effort, 0>aτ  and 0>bτ . 
To obtain point ( )ez θ*  we have to consider that 21 ττ >  implies ( ) ( )ba CC ττ ′>′ . 
Thus ( )( ) ( )zz ba ∆>−∆ ββ 1  and hence ba
a
z
∆−∆
∆
< , with ( ) ( )ejieiii UU θθ ,, −=∆ , 
baji ,, =  and ji ≠ .■ 
 
 
Lemma 2:  Let 
i
khm ,  be the tolerance shown by an individual of type i when the tolerance at 
institutional level is  h
f t=θ   and  knf t=θ ;  let  ji khU ,,    be the expected utility that a 
parent of type i  associates with a type j  child,  being the expectation h
f t=θ   and   
k
nf t=θ .  
 
Maximization of the utility function gives the following: 
- for type  at :  1=
a
aam  ; 21 am
a
ab −= ; 11 am
a
ba −= ; 3am
a
bb =  . 
- for type bt :  0=bm  eθ∀ . 
 
from which, given the assumption of imperfect empathy, we obtain: 
 
for type at :   
 
 
0=aaaaU  1−=
ab
aaU  
( )22 1 aaU aaab −−=  ( )21 aU abab −−=  
( )11 1 aaU aaba −−=  ( )11 aU abba −−=  
( )33 1 aaU aabb −−=  3aU abbb −=  
 
for type bt :   
 
0=bbU  and 1−=baU  eθ∀  
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We can now obtain the value of the different stationary points shown in lemma 2:  
 
 
2
1
=aaz , 
123
2
3
+
=
a
a
zbb , 
( )
( ) 11
1
2
2
2
2
+−
−
=
a
a
zab , 
( )
( ) 11
1
2
1
2
1
+−
−
=
a
a
zba  
 
and given these, proving points 1) 2) and 3) of Lemma 2 is straightforward. ■  
 
 
Proposition 1 
 
From the assumption of proposition 1, we can verify 2/1=aaz  and 01 >∂∂ + tt zz  
( )1,0∈∀ tz . This latter condition ensures that the convergence occurs without oscillations 
around the equilibrium point. Thus: 
1. if 2/1<tz   and 2/11 <+tz   
eθ∀  and the only rational expectations are 
),( bbe =θ ; from lemma 1  tz  converges to bbz . 
2. if  2/1>tz  then: 
a. expectations ),( aae =θ  are always rational since 2/1>∀ tz , we 
have  2/11 >+
aa
tz . From lemma 1 tz  converges to aaz . 
b. There is a  2/1>z  such that if  zz t <≤2/1  then 2/11 <+bbtz , to 
thus verify the expectations ( )bbe ,=θ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
